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PEACE IS NOT PERPETUAL, AUTONOMOUS, OR RATIONAL

Danielle Poe

When I write about and teach Immanuel Kant, I am always impressed and seduced by the beauty and neatness of his work. After
all, Kant makes morality a science; answers are clear and distinct,
black and white. Individuals make ethical decisions by using reason according to universally accessible principles. People should
do the right thing, not because it is easy, not because it makes
them feel good, and not because they have been raised to do so.
People should do the right thing because it is their duty, and they
determine their duty by asking, "Can I universalize my action?" If
yes, then the act is ethical and one's duty. If no, then the act is unethical and not doing so is one's duty. This philosophy is deeply
seductive because it affirms the possibility of doing the right thing
even when doing the wrong thing is easier, safer, and tempting.
The simplicity of this approach appeals to those of us with a commitment to nonviolence in a highly militaristic society. People can
ask themselves, "Can I will that everyone kill other people?" No,
then military force is wrong regardless of how often it has been
used and how entrenched it is in U.S. society. The moral person
will reject violence even if she or he must stand alone.
Kant further seduces philosophers of non-violence in Perpetual
Peace when he lays out a practical plan for attaining perpetual
peace, which for him is the cessation of war (Kant 1983). After
laying out the Preliminary Articles and the Definitive Articles for
perpetual peace, Kant assures the reader that "Taken objectively,
morality is in itself practical, for it is the totality of unconditional-
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ly binding laws according to which we ought to act, and once one
has acknowl dg d th authority of its con pt of duty, it would be
utterly absurd to continue wanting to say that one cannot do his
duty" (Kant 1983, 370). Thus, morality and peace do not depend
upon subjective perspectives and imperfect contexts. Peac falls
under the umbrella of objectiv - morality and unconditional laws.
These laws include abolishing standing armies (Kant 1983, 345),
prohibiting nations from forcibly interfering with other sovereign nation's constitutions and governments (Kant 1983, 345),
and universal hospitality (Kant 1983, 357-358). I applaud each of
these articles, and I admire that Kant turned his philosophical
genius to thinking about ways to bring about peace. This paper,
though, will defend a position that is both more radical and more
practical than Kant's position. The position is more radical than
Kant's because it requires perpetual, peaceful revolution that
seeks justice rather than merely seeking the absence of war. The
position is more practical because it considers the current U.S.
conflict with Iran rather than universal ideals.
At the center of Kant's ethics and political philosophy- and
his philosophy in general-is a commitment to autonomy and rati~nality. For Kant autonomy and rationality are necessarily intertwined. After all, autonomy is" auto-nomos," giving oneself the law,
and the law which we give ourselves is the law of reason, and what
is reasonable is that which preserves autonomy. Autonomy and
reason are mutually reinforcing. In his ethics, Kant arrives at the
centrality of autonomy and reason by searching for a human
good and rejecting other contenders. In the opening line of The
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Moral,s, Kant uses reason to situate
the good will at the heart of morality: "There is no possibility of
thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which
can be regarded as good without qualification, except a good will'
(Kant, 393). Material objects, personality traits, and intelligence
are not good in themselves because each of these things may very
well be used in such a way as to be harmful to oneself or others.
The good will is the good of acting purely according to duty, not
out of self-interest. Duty, in turn, is determined by universal rationality free of subjective considerations.
In Perpetual Peace, the emphasis on autonomy and rationality
manifests itself in the article that states, "No nation shall forcibly
interfere with the constitution and government of another"
(Kant, 346). The rationality that supports this principle is that
nothing can justify such interference; although, Kant does stipulate that other nations can aid a country in which two factions are
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vying for the whole country. Kant leaves no provision, though, for
external countries to interfere in an internal genocide. The con-

sistent application or this principle would result in the onclusion
that because the genocide is happening withiu the borders of
~wanda,

then other countries ought to respect Rwanda's sovere1gn ty. Any ot~er.conclusions ~ould require countries to appeal
to concrete cntena developed m response to the particular di ·asters that are possible today.
While Kant's commitment to autonomy, universal rational laws,
and perpetual peace appeals to philosophers' desire for systems
that can respond to every situation, this system relies on static understandings of subjectivity, law, and peace . Philosophers might
want a universal rule and duty that will require countries to respond to genocide, but the world does not accommodate that
desire. Instead, individuals develop communities, even as they develop in response to their particular communities. A more practical approach to politics entails situating people within a context. The political philosopher Chantal Mouffe offers such a description by describing how people develop their subjectivity in
relation to other people,
To be capable of thinking politics today, and understanding
the nature of these new struggles and the diversity of social
relations that the democratic revolution has yet to encompass, it is indispensable to develop a theory of the subject as
a decentered, detotalized agent, a subject constructed at the
point of intersection of a multiplicity of subject positions between which there exists no a priori or necessary relation
and whose articulation is the result of hegemonic practices.
(Mouffe 1993, 12)
Whereas Kant founds autonomy on a universal plane in which
the moral subject is understood by and grounded in reason,
Mouffe argues that a subject has no universal dimensi~·.m. Rather,
subjectivity happens within a context of diverse practices among
diverse groups. The practices and groups that make up an individual's subjectivity are not determined by her or him; the practices and groups influence the individual and the individual influences the practices and groups, but no particular individual is
the sole determiner of meaning. Morality, laws, and actions have
their source and motivation within these contexts rather than in
a purely objective realm.
Another significant aspect of Mouffe's definition of subjectivity is that she gives up the Enlightenment emphasis on individual-
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ism: "It is necessary to theorize the individual, not as a monad, an
"unencumbered" self that exists prior to and independently of society, but rather as a site constituted by an ensemble of "subject
positions," inscribed in a multiplicity of social relations, the member of many communities and participant in a plurality of collective forms of identification" (Mouffe 1993, 97). Whereas Kant
emphasizes a universal subject who makes decisions based on a
formulation of universal laws, Mouffe emphasizes the situatedness of being a person. People do not make decisions outside of
their situation and their situation provides the rules and the context for what is acceptable and what is not acceptable. Moreover,
people are part of many communities, each of which i~fluence.s
their decisions, judgments, and abilities to act. Some subject positions come with power and influence. Other subject positions are
marginalized, oppressed, and excluded from power. The self is
always in these contexts; it does not first exist as a purely rational
being.
A concrete example of this can be illustrated by considering
my own subject position, which is composed of being a woman,
Caucasian, middle-class, a United States citizen, a Roman Catholic, a feminist, a mother, a spouse, a teacher, a scholar, a daughter, a sister, and so on. To answer the question, "who am I?", I do
not rely on some universal attribute shared by all humans since
?-o. universal attribute exists that explains subjectivity. Subjectivity
is mstead composed of the many overlapping, layered, and heterogeneous positions that I occupy in relation to other people.
Now, consider the description that any other person might offer to describe his or her subjectivity. One can imagine that in
c.omparison to the description of my subjectivity other descript10ns could have significant overlap, some have very little overlap,
~nd some have no overlap, but it is not possible to have an identICal subject description since each subjectivity is determined in
part by relationships with particular people in addition to more
encompassing groups. In the above description of subjectivity,
each community is composed of people who are irreducible.
T~at is, our communities are made up of people with differences.
Within our communities, we organize ourselves and form collective identities. As Mouffe explains, "One of the crucial questions
at stake is the creation of a collective identity, a 'we.' In the question 'What shall we do?', the 'we' is not given but rather constitutes a problem" (Mouffe 1993, 50).
Creating a collective identity, a 'we,' happens in a context and
as a process. 'We' might be a group of people who are opposed
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to a particular war, such as the Vietnam War or the Iraq War. In
another context, we might be a group of people who are opposed
to all wars. The first "we" comes together in response to a particular event and will lose its collective identity after the event concludes. The second "we" is likely to retain its collective identity
much longer because it defines itself in opposition to an ideology rather than to an event. That both of these examples come
from groups who form their identities in opposition to other
groups is significant. 'We' depends on a constitutive outside,
those who are not like 'us.' How 'we' is defined, though, will
change in different situations, and seeking justice means that we
can never be satisfied with current condition . A society that values democracy, difference, and justice should reject Kant's perpetual peace as an ideal.
Peace is not perpetual because no permanent, static, ideal of
peace can ever or should ever be reached. Peace is much more than
a simple absence of conflict. Peace is the presence of just relations
in the world. If peace were simply the absence of conflict, then
peace could be maintained by the threat of violence, or by oppressed groups of people acquiescing in their oppression. Peace requires that people recognize the dignity of other people, the interconnections between people and the world, and the value of diversity in societies. In order to achieve peace, we must engage in what
Emmanuel Levinas calls a "perpetual revolution." The perpetual
revolution requires that we constantly re-evaluate the institutions
that are responsible for maintaining justice in our society, guarding
against the evil that can lurk in good intentions, and always looking for new ways to include marginalized people and groups.
As an example of the need for perpetual revolution, which
guards against evil that taints the good, Levinas describes Stalin's
communism, which begins with just intentions and becomes corrupt by elevating an ideal above the worth of individual people.
Stalin begins with a legitimate critique: people are suffering under capitalism. He continues with a legitimate means of addressing suffering: a more just society requires that resources be held
in common. Obviously, though, Stalin's initial good intentions
led to widespread suffering, intolerance, and political tyranny because the ideals of communism were elevated above the lives of
particular individuals (Burggraeve 2005, 86-90). For Levinas,
every good idea, principle, and institution carries a similar risk.
Even an institution and system that aims to alleviate suffering
must be evaluated to ensure that no individual person is sacrificed for a greater good.
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Here, Levinas and Mouffe will agree to Kant's practical imperative: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in
your own person or in the person of anoLhcr, always al Lh same
time as an end and never simply as a means" (429). Some may
accuse me of forfeiting my postmodern aims at this point because
I am relying on a universal principle. The crucial distinction,
though, between Kant's modern description of this imperative
and my postmodern use of this imperative is Lhal for me a person
can never be understood by any universal formula. For Kant, the
practical imperative to never treat a person simply as a means but
also as an end is derived from the universal d scription of people
as rational beings. F r Levinas and Mouffc, th · impcrativ Lo
never treat a person as an end is derived from the interconnection between people who live in particular contexts. For Kant, the
implications of this imperative lead to universal rule of conducl.
For Levinas and Mouffe, the implications of this imperative lead
to particular acts determined within a context. Universalizing imperatives, refusing to consider challenge , and failing to account
for particular differences carries the danger of sacrificing people
to an ideal.
Roger Burggraeve, one of Levinas' commentators, writes, "Realized justice does not suffice; it is in constant need of correction,
revision, and reform. Only in this way can it avoid petrifying its
own ethical quality and suffocat[ing] in its own opposite. Only
thus can it counter the transformation of the good into evil"
(Burggraeve 2005, 84). From this perspective, justice is a project
that begins in the relationships between individual people. However, Levinas recognizes that our obligations expand far beyond
the people that we meet each day. Even among those we meet
each day, we cannot always respond to the needs of each person.
Thus, every society must have social and political systems and institutions that respond to the concrete n eds of people in a society. But, it will never be the case that we have created a society
that is sufficiently or completely just. As part of the nature of being human, our institutions are finit , or limit d . To maintain justice, we must continually question institutions. We must seek out
those who have been excluded so that their voices can be heard
and their needs can be met.
In order to continually redefine who is included in 'we' and to
bring those who are part of the constitutive outside into the political process it is important to practice democracy throughout our
society. As Mouffe states, "That is, we should proceed from the
democratization of the state to the democratization of society;
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the task is to struggle against autocratic power in all iL<; forms in
order to infiltrate the various spaces still occupied by non-democrati cent rs of power" (Mouffe 1993, 94). When Mouffe states
that we should democratize so icty, she is making an important
point. Power in a society is held in many places outside of formal
politics. Yet, even in these places democracy is desirable.
For Mouffe, democracy has a very specific meaning. First, it is
founded on the liberal tradition of equality and liberty. Second,
democracy has come to value and protect pluralism. Equality, liberty, and pluralism are values that ground our current democracy, but they are value that exist in tension. How do we protect
gro~1ps' a.1~d individuals' rights to I ursue thei1· own projects and
d s~1- · wht~ ~lso making sure that their diversity is rcs1 · t d and
their equality is not compromised? The challenge is to ontinually revise social and political institutions so that groups are not
marginaliz d, but we also want to avoid a stifling consensus
among groups. For Mouffe, too much consensus indicates apathy
and a lack of pluralism and choices. (Mouffe 1993, 6)
The dangers of too much consensus are evident in Burggraeve's reading of Levina in which vii shadows that which was
initially good. The paradigmatic example of the good becoming
evil for Levin.as is Stalin.ism. Stalinism began in a critique of capitalism, specifically a critique of the exploitation of the working
poor by the rich owners of factories. However, Stalin.ism became
evil as it elevated one system of distribution above all others, and
this system became the Good. Once this system became the
Good, it became possible to sacrifice individual people-political
critics, artists, lawyers, intellectuals, anyone who might question
the absolute authority of the system- to the overall good. 1:'h~s,
an initial concern for the well-being of people is perverted 111 its
attempt to install a permanent and unchanging system (Burggraeve 2005, 86-90) .
Thus, for both Levinas and Mouffe a certain amount of consensus is necessary and d sirable in order to accomplish just projects, but too much consensus leads to stagnation, which undermines any possibility for forming a just society Just as it was necessary to constantly define and evaluate who "we" ar , societies
must also define and evaluate who "they" are. Mouffe defines
"they" in two ways: those who have different perspectives but play
by the same political rules and those who refuse even the political rules by which we operate. The U.S. political divide between
republicans and democrats illustrates the first category of those
who have different ideas but are within the same political con-
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text. Republicans and democrats run for political offices on different political platforms. During this process, Americans expect
to hear different ideas about how to manage social problems
such as poverty, healthcare, and education. U.S. citizens vote in
order to choose one set of ideas over another. The differences
that candidates manifest help to keep democracy vibrant, and a
lack of distinction between the candidates and their ideas undermines the democratic process. After the election, both sides
abide by the decisions reached in the process.
For example, Al Gore and George W. Bush ran for president in
2000. Gore and Bush mapped out very different visions for the
U.S. A majority of people voted for Gore, but Bush won the votes
in the Electoral College and decisions of the Supreme Court to
become president. Gore continues to give a very different perspective than the one offered by Bush, but both remain committed to the election process. As Mouffe states, "One should not
hope for the elimination of disagreement but for its containment
within forms that respect the existence ofliberal democratic institutions" (Mouffe 1993, 50). Disagreement provides an opportunity for choice, provides critiques of unjust institutions, and illuminates new paths to pursue justice. Problems develop when disagreement becomes antagonism such that disagreement becomes violent or prevents any action .
While disagreement between groups is desirable in the proper
context, another division exists between groups within a liberal,
democratic context and groups who refuse this context. This distinction is the friend and enemy distinction. Another group becomes an enemy rather than "they" when the group operates outside the rules by which "us" and "them" play and when the group
defines itself in opposition to the identity of us and them (Mouffe
1993, 2-3). For this paper, "enemy" will define those whose
actions threaten the flourishing of other groups. Many philosophers argue that the friend/ enemy distinction can be overcome.
For some, friend/enemy is overcome by distinguishing between
people and their beliefs or actions in order to fight the actions
but not the person. This approach is especially helpful in adhering to the imperative to treat all people as end-in-themselves.
Gandhi follows this approach when he cites the Christian imperative to, "Hate the sin and not the sinner" (Fischer 2002, 83).
From this perspective, action against injustice, violence, and oppression is aimed at both the oppressed and the oppressor. Ideally, the nonviolent action will convert the oppressor and free the
oppressed. Others argue that the distinction between friend and
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enemy should be overcome through political institutions that
transform antagonisms into agonistic politics. Theorists of agonistic politics reason that people will always divide themselves
into diverse groups with conflicting interests and ideas that will
transform into violent conflict unles proc sses and institutions
are in place tor solve the conni ts. Th r ' 'Olution will f How the
~xampl that I outlined above: ociety will ad I l one side's beliefs, ideas, and policies, but the different ideas will still exist to
challenge and reform current institutions.
. My own position is that the friend and enemy distinction is as
Irresolvable as the us and them distinction. The challenge is to
address the split between friend and enemy with nonviolent actions. In this context, enemy refers to those who oppose another
group's beliefs, ideas, and actions and refuse to participate in
institutions in which those differences could be resolved. While
Gandhi's affirmation of separating others' identities from their
beliefs helps to maintain the focus on all people's humanity, it
fails to recognize that people are known through their words and
actions. A deeper sense of identity does not manifest itself politically. While one group might refuse to use the term enemy to
describe another group, the friend/ enemy distinction is already
in place if one of the groups applies the description to the other.
Martin Luther King,Jr.'s d s ription of the biblical imperative
to "love your enemy" helps to focus on how the friend/ enemy distinction can focus nonviolent practices. King's description begins
with a distinction similar to Gandhi's distinction between the person and her or his actions. King writes that one should love "the
person who does an evil deed while hating the deed that the person does. I think that this is what Jesus meant when he said 'love
your enemies."' His next words, though, make clear that even if
King makes a distinction between a person and her or his actions,
the group that he is struggling against is not using such a distinction. King writes, "I'm very happy that he didn't say like your enemies, because it is pretty difficult to like some people. Like is sentimental, and it is pretty difficult to like someone bombing your
home; it is pretty difficult to like somebody threatening your children; it is difficult to like congressmen who spend all of their
time trying to defeat civil rights" (Washington 1986, 46-4 7) .
Those who bomb homes, threaten children, and refuse civil
rights to otl1ers view those against whom they commit violence as
enemies. King cannot control the understanding that this other
group has of him and other African-Americans, but he can control
his response and he can ref·use to cooperate with these enemies.
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Many people believe that people such as King and Gandhi
were heroes and charismatic leaders but nonviolence has no relevance in today's violent world. This skepticism about nonviolence reflects a belief in much of what has been stated. People
think nonviolence cannot work because they believe that local
conditions determine what can and cannot be effective; they do
not believe that universal rules of reason and morality exist or are
effective. Further, people believe that enemies exist. In our own
global situation, I would suggest that we determine the catego~ies
of friend and enemy by working through international organizations. Two examples of documents already in place to fra~e
these discussions are the United Nations' Universal Declarat10n
of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions. Both of these
documents were created through wide consultation with countries from around the world and endorsed by countries from
around the world. These documents draw out very clear standards for acceptable and unacceptable conduct, and they do so
without reference to static, universal principles.
Although treaties and declarations exist, others violate the standards that these documents put forth. Those who violate the standards. are enemies, but those violations can be upheld witho~t
resorung to war. One of the most persuasive articulations of this
point comes from the work of David Cortright who is the Presi?ent
of Fourth Freedom Forum, a Research Fellow at the Kroc Institute
for International Peace at the University of Notre Dame, the
author of Gan.dhi and Beyon_d: Nonviol,ence for an Age of Terrorism
(2006), and, with Howard Zmn, the author of Soldier in Revolt: GI
~esistanceD.uring the ~ietnam ~ar (2006). Cortright has offered ??nviolent opuons for withdrawing from Iraq without comprom1s111g
U.S. security, for confronting global terrorism, and for opposing
Iran's aspirations to have nuclear weapons (Cortright 2003, 1113; Cortright 2004, 14-17; Cortright 2005, 62-64; Cortright 2005,
7-7; Cortright 2006, 12-14; Cortright 2006, 18-22; Cortright 2006,
24-27; Cortright 2006, 7-7; Cortright and Lopez 2004, 30).
As democrats and republicans seem intent on beating the war
drums to gather support to invade Iran, I will focus on Cortright's
arguments that non-military strategies will be more effective than
a military invasion to keep Iran within the constraints of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that it has signed. At this
point, Iran is in compliance with the NPT. Cortright's argument
has seven points. First, the U.S. ought to work with the United
Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency to encourage Iran to give up building nuclear weapons. Two, the U .S.
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should focus on keeping Iran in the NPT. This will keep inspectors in Iran; these inspectors will find traces of activity long before
Iran can develop weapons. Nuclear technology leaves dramatic
radioactive traces in soil and in the water that inspectors can easily find. Third, the U.S. needs to engage in a diplomatic surge,
instead of a military surge. This would entail a summit between
the U.S. and Iran with no preconditions. Fourth, the U.S. could
offer incentives rather than threats. Iran has billions of dollars in
the U.S. that has been frozen since 1979. This money could be
turned over to non-state entities. Sanctions could be lifted; open
exchange could be implemented. Fifth, the U.S. could offer a ecurity assurance by pledging not to use military force against
Iran. Sixth, the U.S. can connect diplomatic efforts in Iran to
NPT efforts in the Middle East in order to create a zone free of
weapons of mass destruction. Finally, the U.S. could take force off
the table completely and pledge to work through diplomatic
means (Cortright 2006, 24-27; 2006, 7; 2007).
When this paper began, I noted that Kant's philosophy appeals
to me by virtue of its philosophical neatness: answers are clear,
rational, and universal. Throughout the paper, I have argued that
the world does not operate in such a way as to accommodate
clear, universal answers that will be binding on all rational people. To quote Jean-Francois Lyotard from 17ie Postmodern Condition, "But our incredulity is now such that we no longer expect salvation to rise from these inconsistencies ... " (Lyotard 1984, xxiv) .
The complexity and diversity of the world is such th~t people may
choose to act in ways that they clearly would not wish to be urnversalized, and they may choose to believe in rights even though
they have no universal ground from which these rights can be
derived or from which others can be convinced to respect these
rights. These truisms do not indicate a position of despair; rather,
they indicate that people must continually define what they mean
by democracy, rights, equality, justice, and peace. The process of
defining these terms requires that people disagree, argue, and
defend diverse definitions in order to produce definitions that
will include people and groups who have been marginalized and
reflect the needs of a particular context.
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